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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SvEREIGN'S

IMMqNITY FROM SUIT IN

THE FEDERAL CouRT:-Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Indiana, 123 F.
Supp. 783 (S.D. Ind. 1954). The plaintiff in this case sought to
enjoin the State of Indiana as well as the representatives of the
Indiana State Fair Board in an action of replevin for special
lighting fixtures installed at the coliseum building at the Indiana
State Fair Grounds. The state holds a fee simple title in the fair
grounds and acts as trustee for and on behalf of the people of
Indiana. The representatives of the Board, acting in their official
capacity, had a. misunderstanding as to the ownership of the
lighting fixtures, a previous agreement having been effected between the plaintiff and a third party, acting for the Board, concerning the equipment in question. The case was in the federal
court because of a diversity of citizenship between the parties.
The plaintiff contends that the State of Indiana was not the real
party in interest; that the legislature of the state, by the broad
powers it had vested in the Indiana State Fair Board, had
waived its sovereign immunity in regard to the Board's business
transactions for the reason that these transactions were similar
to that of private enterprises. The court held that the Board was
not a separate corporate entity, but that it was an instrumentality

of the state and hence the state had not waived its sovereign
immunity.
The issue then, as to whether the parties-defendant are merely
nominal or real parties in interest has been the problem genrally presented to the courts as regards state immunity under
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution. The historic case
on this point is Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), wherein the Court decided that the
suit was not'one against the state unless the state be named as a
member to the record. This rule, however, has been repudiated
and the only major consideration today is that the court does
not stop at the nominal parties in the litigation but looks behind
the litigants on the record to see actually who are the real
parties in interest. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Poindexter
v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885). In the Poindexter case, supra,
the Court said at 114 U.S., page 287: ".

.

. the question whether

a suit is within the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment is
not always determined by reference to the nominal parties of
the record." The perplexity of the situation is to determine what
distinction can be drawn between nominal and real parties.
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Oftentimes this must be done in the light of state legislation to
determine what power or what autonomy was given to the
party in question.
The principle upon which the courts have decided whether
or not the state is a real party to the suit is determined by an
analysis of the relief sought, for the central point is: does such
relief in effect impose liability upon the state. In Colorado ex Tel.
Watrous v. District Court, 207 F.2d 50, 56 (10th Cir. 1953), the
court said, "Whether a suit is one against a state is to be determined . . . by the result of the judgment or decree which may
be entered." Larsen v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682 (1949); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373
(1902). States which incorporate associations do not grant immunity to the corporations in which the states have participated
unless so stipulated in the powers given to the corporation;
"as a member of a corporation, a government never exercises
its sovereignty." The Bank of the United States v. Planter'sBank
of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 908 (1824). Followed in,
Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 318 (1829). Therefore it was held in Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221
U.S. 636, 645 (1911), that:
. . . Neither public corporations nor political subdivisions are
clothed with that immunity from-suit which belongs to the state
alone by virtue of its sovereignty.
The court has often taken the view that if the state is affected in
a pecuniary sense then the state is a real party to the suit.
McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662 (1890). "The prohibition of
the Eleventh Amendment is applicable only if the state is the
real party in interest, as when it is pecuniarily directly affected."
Murray v. Transit Comm'n, 11 F. Supp. 27, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
Some instances in which the court has construed the state to be
so affected are: collection of taxes, Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S.
18 (1933); state property, Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925),
Cunningham v. Macon and Brunswick Ry., 109 U.S. 446 (1883);
prohibition of suit against the superintendent of public works,
Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921); performance of contracts, Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918), Tianscontinental &
Western Air v. Farley, 71 P.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1934); non-acceptance of state bond coupons for tax purposes, McGahey v.
Virginia, 135 U.S. 662 (1890); raising of taxes, Louisiana, ex rel.
New York Guaranty and Indemnity Co. v. Steele, 134 U.S. 230
(1890), North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890). However, suits against state agencies for the administration of state
statutes do not necessarily constitute an action against the state.
In Murray v. Transit Comm'n, 11 F. Supp. 27, 29 (S.D.N.Y.
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1935), the court held that:
...
general governmental interest is not that which makes the
state, as an organized political community, a party in interest in
the litigation, for if that were so the state would be a party in interest in all litigation; because the purpose of all litigation is to preserve and enforce rights and secure compliance with the law of the
state, either statute or common. The interest must be one in the
state as an artificial person.

Accord, Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Ry. v. Missouri R.R. and
Warehouse Comm'rs, 183 U.S. 53 (1901).
In the Brief for Appellant, p. 469, In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443
(1887), was enumerated certain criteria applicable when deciding whether the suit is one against the state or not:
The tests are as follows: (1) Whether a State is named as a party
on the record; (2) Whether the action is directly upon the contract;
(3) Whiether the suit was brought to control the discretion of an
executive of the State; (4) Whether the suit was brought for the
purpose of administering the funds actually in the public treasury;
(5) Whether it is an attempt to compel officers of the State to do
acts which constitute a performance of its contract by the State;
(6) Where the case is such that the State is a necessary party, that
the delendent may by [sic] protected from liability to it.
In the present case, the court used the above test as to whether
the source of funds used for the operation of the Board was

derived solely from state appropriation. It also interpreted
the power granted to the Board by the Indiana legislature as
being indicative of the close relationship existing between the
Board and the state. The court seemed to favor most the argument that the members of the Board were elected from the state
agricultural districts. This certainly would indicate that the
Board was acting as an agency of the state for the benefit of the
people in such a capacity.
Also in cases where authorization to waive immunity has
been provided in a particular state statute, it has been held
that a suit should be brought before the state court and not
the federal court. O'Neill v. Early, 208 .F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1953).
The general trend has been to a more strict approach to state
immunity in the federal courts. The federal courts have felt that
this issue is more properly determined in the light of state
legislation and is more of an individual problem of the state
than that of the federal court. Recent decisions have followed
this view unless the state has waived its immunity in the federal
courts by statute. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n,
327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945); Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Reed, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
The federal courts then, have given an equitable approach to
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the problem of state immunity. It has promulgated rules which
are not necessarily harsh to the litigant seeking relief and has
properly left the question in the majority of cases to the state
courts to decide. The eleventh amendment called for such immunity and the federal courts have provided for such as far
as the dictates of reason and fair play will allow.
John Rogers

CORPORATIONs-DIssoLuTION-PRESUMPTION AGAINST PARTICIPATION BY PREFERRED STOCK IN LIQUIDATION PnxoPT.-Mohawk

Carpet Mills, Inc. v Delaware Rayon Co ....
Del. Ch... ., 110
A.2d 305 (1954). The Delaware Rayon Co., a Delaware corporation, was dissolved in October, 1954. The present action was
brought by certain class A stockholders who objected to the
terms of the proposed liquidation plan regarding the distribution
of surplus assets. The plan provided for repayment of full par
value of the Class A stock, and for all remaining assets to be
distributed solely among the Class B stockholders. The Class A
stockholders maintained that in the absence of a provision in
the corporate charter to the contrary, the rights of all stockholders to share in the surplus were equal. The Delaware statute
controlling the rights of preferred stockholders provided: "The
holders of preferred or special stock of any class . . . shall b6
entitled to such rights upon dissolution of.. . the corporation as
shall be stated and expressed in the certificate of incorporation
. " DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, §151 (d) (1953).
In regard to the respective rights of Class A and B stockholders, the charter provided that Class A was to have preference
to both dividend payment and to repayment of capital upon dissolution. While Class A was granted the right to share ratably
with Class B in surplus dividend distribution after both classes
had received their stated dividend, the charter was significantly
silent regarding the right of Class A to participate further in
the distribution of surplus assets after being repaid at par.
The question then presented was whether the preference rights
to payment of dividends and capital, granted to the Class A
stockholders, were exhaustive, and denied to this group the
right to share further in the distribution of surplus assets beyond
their stated preference. The court held that the rights expressly
granted to the Class A stockholders created a presumption that
the rights so stated were exhaustive, and that the Class A stockholders had failed to establish that the charter entitled them to
further participation.
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In positing the burden of proof upon the holders of the preferred shares, the court gave recognition and approval to the
rule established in recent English cases. Scottish Insurance Corp.
v. Wilson and Clyde Coal Co., [1949] A.C. 462; In re Isle of
Thanet Electric Supply Co., [1949] 2 All E.R. 1060 (C.A.) The
significance of the decision in the instant case lies in the fact that
it represents the first instance of a United States court expressly
delineating the participatory rights of preference stockholders in
dissolution to their stated priority to repayment, without recourse
to implying a limitation from the terms of the charter. In the
relatively few instances in which a similar question has arisen
in this country, the courts have proceeded on the principle that
the rights of classes of stockholders are contractual, and that the
articles of incorporation constitute the repository of these rights.
By scrutinizing the articles, the courts were able to discover an
implied limitation which precluded further participation by the
preference shareholders. See Williams v. Renshaw, 220 App.
Div. 39, 220 N.Y. Supp. 532 (3d Dept. 1927); Murphy v. Richardson Dry Goods Co., 326 Mo. 1, 31 S.W.2d 72 (1930) (based on the
Renshaw case).
In any question concerning the respective rights of classes
of stockholders, the courts in both England and this country have
been guided by two underlying principles. The first is that, in
the absence of specified rights or limitations, all stockholders are
entitled to share equally in liquidated surplus assets. Birch v.
Cooper, 14 App. Cas. 525 (1889). As stated in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Galveston City R.R., 107 Fed. 311, 318 (5th Cir. 1901):
When a corporation is dissolved . . . if there are any assets left
after paying off the debts they are ordinarily distributed between
the stockholders in proportion to the number of shares which each
holds. There is no preference of one stockholder over other stockholders, except such preference is expressly contracted for.
Secondly, the courts universally adhere to the rule that rights

of respective classes of stockholders are determined by statute
and by the terms of the articles of incorporation. Crocker v.
Waltham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397, 53 N.E.2d 230 (1944); West
Duluth Land Co. v. Northwestern Textile Co., 176 Minn. 588, 224
N.W. 245 (1929); Lloyd v. Pennsylvania Electric Vehicle Co., 75
N.J. Eq. 263, 72 Atl. 16 (1909). The difficulty ensues when, as
in the instant case, a precise application of the foregoing principles
is required but the charter is not explicit on its face.
The question of participatory rights in dissolution has been
somewhat obscured by the conflict of authority on the related
problem of the right of preferred shareholders to participate in
additional dividend distribution beyond their stated priority.
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Generally, the courts both in England, Will v. United Lankat
Plantations Co., 1914 A.C. 11 (1913), and in the United States,
Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., 202 Fed. 141 (2d Cir. 1913),
cert. denied, 231 U.S: 748 (1913), have denied further participation in this situation. However, in Englander v. Osborne, 261
Pa. 366, 104 Atl. 614 (1918), it was held that after common stock
had received a dividend equal to that received by the preferred
stock, both classes were entitled to share equally in any excess.
While there is authority to the effect that the problems are so
analagous that it would be inconsistent not to imply a limitation
to further participation in dissolution from a stated preference
to repayment, BALLANTINE, CORPORaTIONS §217 (2d ed. 1946),
the English courts until recently have treated the question as
entirely distinct, on the grounds that one theory refers to rights
in a going concern while the other refers to rights in liquidation.
In re William Metcalfe and Sons Ltd., [1933] 1 Ch. 142 (1932).
In the few instances in which United States courts have determined the extent of participatory rights of preferred stock
beyond the stated liquidation priority, the courts have adherred
to the principle that, in the absence of an express limitation in
the charter, the rights of preferred and common stockholders
are equal. However, the courts have then proceeded to construe
the charters in question so as to imply a prohibition against
further participation. Williams v. Renshaw, supra;"Murphy v.
Richardson Dry Goods Co., supra. In the former case, the charter
provided that in dissolution preferred stockholders were to be
"paid in full at par" before any amount was to be paid to common
stockholders. This was held to mean that payment at par was
to be payment in full and precluded further participation by preferred stockholders. In the Murphy case, supra,a similar question
was involved and the court cited with approval the decision in
the Williams case, supra, and held that the stated right to be
"paid in full" was exhaustive. In line with these decisions, it
would not have been unreasonable for the court in the instant
case to have held that the right "to receive cash to the amount
of the par value of the Class A stock" was similarly indicative
of a limitation on further sharing. However, by looking to the
English courts for a rule of construction, the court was able
to arrive at the same conclusion while avoiding the risks of an
arbitrary interpretation.
Although comparatively rare in this country, the question
posed in the instant case has been the subject of considerable
litigation in the English courts and periodic diverse holdings have
resulted. When the charter is silent as to participatory rights in
liquidation, the decisions are in accord to the effect that all
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stockholders are deemed to have equal rights on the basis of
the value of their shares. Birch v. Cropper, 14 App. Cas. 525
(1889); In re Isle of Thanet Electric Supply Co., supra. However, when one class of stockholders is granted a preference to
repayment of capital, the unanimity of the case holdings disappears.
The decision of the Chancery Division in In re Espuela Land
and Cattle Co., [1909] 2 Ch. 187, was indicative of the majority
view until very recently. Here the charter granted to preferred
stockholders prior rights to dividend payment and to repayment
of capital. Expressing approval of Birch v. Cropper, supra, the
court held that these rights were not exhaustive, and that in the
absence of an express limitation, the right of preferred stockholders to share in surplus liquidated assets was equal to the
right of the common stockholders. However, a contrary decision
was reached in In re National Telephone Co., [1914] 1 Ch. 755
(1913). In the latter case the court held that a preference to
repayment of capital was analogous to a preference for dividend
payment, and since the latter was considered to be exhaustive,
following the rule in Will v. United Lankat PlantationsCo., supra,
the preferential right to repayment of capital was accordingly
held to preclude further claim. In subsequent cases, this holding
was confined to its particular facts, and the rule as expressed
by In re Espuela Land and Cattle Co., supra, was followed. See
In re Fraserand Chalmers, Ltd., [1919] 2 Ch. 114 and In re John
Dry Steam Tugs, Ltd., [1932] 1 Ch. 594.
In England, the right of a class of stockholders to participate in
the distribution of surplus liquidated assets beyond their stated
preference was considered to have been settled by the decision
in In re William Metcalfe and Sons Ltd., supra. The court stated,
[1933] 1 Ch. at 148:
... preference shareholders . . . must be treated as having all
the rights of shareholders except so far as they renounced those
rights on their admission to the company. It is for the ordinary
shareholder here to establish that the preference shareholders
renounced their rights to participate in the surplus assets now
distributable. (Emphasis added.)

This view prevailed until 1949, when the Scottish Insurance
Corp. case, [1949] A.C. 462, was decided. A colliery, being faced
with inevitable liquidation because of the COAL INDUSTRY NATIONALIZATION ACT, 1946, 9 & 10 GEO. 6, c. 59, attempted to

extinguish the preferred stock by returning paid-in capital prior
to the liquidation. The holders of preferred stock objected on
the grounds that they would lose their right to share in the
distribution of any surplus assets. It was held by a majority of

1955

RECENT DECISIONS

the House of Lords that the plan was not discriminatory since
the preferred stockholders were entitled only to their stated
preference rights which included priority to repayment of capital.
In this decision, the court rejected the rule established by the
Metcalfe case, supra, and indicated that the latter had been
wrongly decided. Until the subsequent decision in the Thanet
Electric case, supra, it was uncertain whether the holding in
the Scottish Insurance Corp. case, supra, would be confined to
the unusual factual situation which prevailed there, or whether
it would be accepted as establishing a new precedent.
The issue in the Thanet Electric case, [1949] 2 All E.R. 1060,
was raised on an appeal from a decision based on the earlier
rule, in the Metcalf case, supra, i.e., that the burden of proving
that a class of stockholders was not entitled to share beyond its
stated preference to repayment of capital upon dissolution, was
upon the ordinary stockholders who were challenging this
right. The rights conferred upon the preferred class by the
charter in this case were essentially the same as in the instant
case. The court of appeals, by a subtle analysis of the decision in
the Scottish Insurance Corp. case, supra, held that the latter
case had initiated a broad principle of construction. The court
stated, [1949] 2 All E.R. at 1063, that:
In my view ... Lord Normand [in the Scottish Insurance Corp.
case. supra,] took the view that the same principle applies to the
construction of rights in a winding-up as applies to the construction
of dividend rights ....
It, therefore, seems to me plain that he
takes the view that the onus in such a case as this lies on the
holders of preference shares. (Emphasis added.)

Accordingly, the court held that in any question of the extent
of participatory rights, either as to dividends or surplus assets
upon dissolution, where the rights of a class are set out, they
are prima facie exhaustive. Since the preferred shareholders
failed to overcome this presumption, the decision of the lower
court was reversed, and the assets remaining after repayment
of the preferred stock were ruled to be the sole property of the
ordinary shareholders.
To the court in the instant case, the rule of law expressed in
the Thanet Electric case, supra, furnished an equitable solution
to an unusual and somewhat perplexing problem. If followed,
this decision will have the effect of greatly facilitating the solution of any question involving the determination of the extent
of participatory rights. Relatively arbitrary interpretation will
be replaced by a binding presumption of law. It is submitted
that the instant decision represents a correct definition of participating rights. The holders of prior rights to repayment of capital
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receive the benefits which normally would be anticipated and
bargained for, and they lose only an uncertain claim to windfall
profits. In any event, should a further participatory right be
considered necessary, a provision to that effect in the articles
of incorporation would be sufficient to defeat the presumption
against such participation.
Thomas S. Calder

COURTS -

APPLICATION

OF STATE LAW

UNDER

DIVERsITY

OF

CITIZENSHIP-WEIGHT ACCORDED TO LOWER COURT DECISIONS.-

Eckman v. Baker, 126 F. Supp. 656 (W.D. Pa. 1954). An agent,
driving his wife's car in Pennsylvania, in the course of his work
for the defendant, collided with an automobile driven by the
plaintiff. The latter had process served on the defendant employer through the Secretary of the Commonwealth, pursuant
to the Pennsylvania Non-resident Motorist Service Statute, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 75 §1201 (1953), which provides that such service
can be had on non-resident "operators" and "owners" of motor
vehicles that are operated in Pennsylvania by or on behalf of
said "operators" and "owners." The defendant, a citizen of Massachusetts, appeared specially to challenge jurisdiction based on

this service, claiming that he could not properly be served under
the statute because he was neither the "owner" nor the "operator"
of the car, even though he did defray gas and oil expenses incurred in its operation. It was found that the appellate courts of
Pennsylvania had never been called upon to construe this statute.
However, four common pleas decisions ranging over the last
twenty years had consistently construed the statute to apply
only to operators of motor vehicles in Pennsylvania, and to
owners having the same operated within the state. The statute
was amended in 1949 in the light of these interpretations, and
the specific section in question was left intact.
The question presented to the court for decision was whether
a federal judge in a diversity case is bound to follow lower state
court decisions where there is no appellate authority in point.
The court concluded that although it was not bound by the
lower court holdings, they should be accorded great weight in
the absence of convincing evidence that they would be overruled
on appeal to the supreme court of the state.
The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, §34, has laid down the requirement that all federal courts must follow the laws of the
several states in trials at common law, so long as they do not
conflict with the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
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States. 1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U.s.c. §1652 (1952). The Supreme
Court, in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), construed
"the laws" to mean local statutory laws only, and this holding
went unchallenged for almost a century until in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court, reversing its
earlier position, denied the right of federal courts sitting in
diversity cases to apply "the general law" of "federal common
law" rather than the body of common law in force in the state
as declared by its highest court. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
supra, has supplied the basic premise, and the soundness of that
decision is beyond the scope of this discussion.
When there has been no authoritative declaration of state law
by the particular state courts, the federal courts have either
attempted to arrive at the same result which, in their opinion,
would be reached by the highest state court, American Employers'
Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 218 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir.
1954) (dictum); or they have applied their independent judgment
and assumed that the state courts would reach the same reasonable conclusion. Daily v. Parker,152 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1945)
(dictum). In attempting to determine the applicable state law,
the federal courts have consulted the applicable statutes, the
intent of the legislature, the opinions and reports of committees,
the opinions of the state courts, their considered dicta, the
methods pursued by state courts in reaching their decisions (e.g.,
policies followed in construing contracts, textbooks, laws of
other states, historical studies, etc.) and the reports and opinions
of the state bar association. See Harnett and Thornton, Precedent
in the Erie-Tompkins Manner: A Decade in Retrospect, 24
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 770 (1949).
Where the state law is unsettled, a federal court cannot delay
its decision until a state tribunal of last resort has expressed its
position in the form of an authoritative opinion. The controversy
must be settled, and it is the duty of the federal courts to do so.
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). On the other
hand, state supreme court silence does not give a federal court
freedom to apply the rule it considers best if the question has
been answered by the state intermediate appellate court, unless
there is convincing evidence that the highest state court would
reach a different result. West v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940). In the West case, the state supreme
court had refused to review the lower court's decision. In Fidelity
Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940), where the only
state decisions in point were two holdings of the Chancery Court
of New Jersey, the federal court was nevertheless held bound.
This would appear to represent an extension of the doctrine of
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the West case, supra, in that the state supreme court had never
considered the case, and because the chancery court, although
it had state-wide authority in equity proceedings comparable
to the intermediate appellate court on the law side, was still a
court of original jurisdiction.
In Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940), one
of the state's three appellate courts had twice decided the same
issue between the parties, and the state supreme court had dedined review. The United State Supreme Court held that the
failure of the federal court to follow the two state court decisions
was reversible error.
It is immaterial that the federal court may think that the state
appellate court's ruling is wrong. That a federal court must
follow the law declared by a state intermediate appellate court,
even though it believes the state supreme court will overrule
the lower decision, or that another state appellate court might
reach a contrary conclusion was decided in McLouth Steel Corp.
v. Mesta Machine Co., 214 F.2d 608 (3d Cir. 1954).
The holding in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, supra, gave
rise to a certain amount of confusion in its application by the
federal courts. One federal district court, while stating that it
doubted that it was bound by two state common pleas decisions,
nevertheless followed them because it believed that the state
superior court would uphold the lower decisions on the basis
of a prior decision by that court. The federal circuit court reversed the district court's decision on the ground that the superior
court decision relied upon was not in point. The court then went
on to give its own interpretation of the statute involved in the
case. In re Berlin, 147 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1945). Where a state
supreme court dismissed an appeal from an unreported decision
of a county court, the federal court of appeals held that it was
bound by that decision, even though the court was of the opinion
that the county court had departed from precedent, since there
was no convincing evidence that this decision did not represent
the law of the state. Gustin v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 152 F.2d 447
(6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 866 (1946).
Later, the Supreme Court, in King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948), limited its
holding in the Fidelity case, supra, by deciding that federal
courts need not follow the decisions of a lone state trial court
whose unpublished decisions are not binding in any subsequent
cases in that court or in any other state court. The two cases
are clearly distinguishable on the extent of the jurisdiction of
the state courts involved. The Fidelity case concerned a state
chancery court whose published decisions were binding in later
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cases and could be reversed only by the highest court of the
state. In the King case, supra, the Court carefully confined its
holding to the particular facts involved, expressly pointing out,
333 U.S. at 162, that its decision was not:
... to be taken as promulgating a general rule that federal courts
need never abide by determinations of state law by state trial courts.
As indicated by the Fidelity Union Trust Co. case, other situations
in other states may well call for a different result.

Following the reasoning of the King case, supra, the federal circuit court, in Doggrell v. Great Southern Box Co., 206 F.2d 671
(6th Cir. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir.
1953), held that the decisions of a state chancery court which are
not published, even though the court is a court of record, need not
be followed. The decisions of a single common pleas court were
held not to be binding on the federal courts in Sunbeam Corp.
v. Civil Service Employees' Cooperative Ass'n., 187 F.2d 768
(3d Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 192 F.2d 572 (3d Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952), even though the decisions were reported, solely on the ground that the court's
jurisdiction was very limited and its decisions had no binding
effect on other state courts. The court added, by way of dictum,
that where decisions of lower courts form a ". . sufficient body
of nisi prius opinion to form a consensus of legal thought on a
given subject," a federal court should join in such a consensus.
187 F.2d at 772.
Other decisions which have followed the general language of
the King case, supra, are: Berkshire Land Co. v. FederalSecurity
Co., 199 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1952); Lattavo Bros., Inc. v. Hudock,
119 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Pa. 1953); Stinson v. Edgemoor Iron
Works, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 861 (D. Del. 1944). In Neff v. Hindman,
77 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Pa. 1948), a case involving the same statute
as the principal case, it was held that a federal court need not
accept as binding the decision of a single common pleas court
which was opposed to a prior state supreme court ruling and to

the report of the legislative committee which drafted the rule
of procedure involved. The fact that there was no indication of
a contrary holding by the supreme court was held sufficient to
bind the federal court to follow a superior court decision in
Stinson v. Edgemoor Iron Works, Inc., supra. Further weight was
given to the lone court decision by the fact that it was in line
with the weight of authority and also due to the capacity of
superior court judges in Delaware to sit as supreme court
justices. In Lattavo Bros., Inc. v. Hudock, supra,the district court
held itself bound by the decision of a common pleas court because
it was convinced that the state supreme court would agree with
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the decision of the lower state court. This is perhaps the furthest
point to which federal courts have gone in finding themselves
bound by lower state court decisions.
Where a state supreme court has reached a conclusion opposed
to two orphans' court decisions which were widely separated in
time and place, the federal court has disregarded them in its
attempt to discover the applicable state law. Berkshire Land Co.
v. Federal Security Co., supra. Since these decisions were not
binding on other state courts, and not even on other orphans'
courts in that very same state, the court reasoned that they
should not be binding in a federal tribunal.
From these various decisions, several basic conclusions may
be drawn in regard to the factors which will be considered by
the federal courts in determining the weight to be accorded to
lower state court decisions. Although no ne case has turned on
all of these factors, the following considerations have been consistently deemed relevant: whether the decision runs contrary
to the letter or policy of higher court decisions; the rank of the
court in the state judicial structure; the extent to which its
decisions are binding on other state courts of lower and coordinate jurisdiction; the number of other trial courts that have
arrived at a similar conclusion; the court's jurisdictional limits;
the length of time these decisions have been in effect without
being reversed or appealed; whether or not the statute construed
by the court has been amended without affecting the construction
placed upon it; whether or not the court is a court of record and
its decisions are so reported and published as' to be readily available; whether the lower court decisions are widely separated in
time and place; and whether the lower court's decision has followed the weight of authority.
In the instant case, the court discussed the absence of contrary
decisions and dicta from higher court, the failure of the legislature
to amend the section of the statute construed by the lower courts,
the number of lower court decisions to the same effect, their
longevity, and their soundness. On the basis of these considerations, the court held that it was bound only to give great weight
to the lower court decisions. Due to the fact that these common
pleas decisions undoubtedly represented the state law on the
particular point in question, it is submitted that the court would
have been more accurate by admitting that it was bound by such
decisions.
Edward S. Mraz
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COURTS-IMiPROPER CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL JUDGEINTERFERENCE WITH TESTIMONY

DEPRIVATION OF FUNDAMVENTAL

OF WITNESSES

CONSTITUTING A

RIGHTS.--Ohio v. Lawrence, 162

Ohio St. 412, 123 N.E.2d 271 (1954). The defendant was arrested
and charged with manslaughter in the second degree. Waiving
trial by jury, his defense was presented to the court, supported
by the testimony of three witnesses. The record of the trial court
revealed that the judge had constantly interrupted defense counsel during direct examination of his witnesses; that the defense
witnesses were directly or indirectly accused of falsification or
inaccuracy when their answers were not in accordance with
testimony given by the prosecution; that each witness was threatened with imprisonment for perjury when their answers appeared undetailed and conflicted with previous witnesses, or
incapable of being heard. It appeared that all of the witnesses
were attempting to be accurate and cooperative. The defendant
was convicted and an appeal was directed to the Supreme Court
of Ohio, after the court of appeals had affirmed, on the ground
that the trial court had, by its manner and conduct with the
witnesses, deprived the defendant of his right to a fair and
impartial trial. The supreme court, after reviewing the record,
reversed the conviction and remanded the case for retrial fi
conformity with the fundamental rights of every person charged
with a crime. The court determined that the atmosphere of this
trial fell "far short of the plain requirements of the law."
It is manifest that a defendant in a criminal trial has the right
to demand a fair and an impartial court. Determining when a
particular defendant may object to the conduct of the trial
judge has long been a perplexing problem for the courts. Historically, the position of the judge in the United States has differed
greatly from that of the Continental courts. The judge in English
practice was never dominated by the tendency of the common
law to relegate the judge to the position of an umpire. 'The
English judge is said to perform an active part as director of the
proceedings and is considered the administrator of justice. See
generally, 3 WiGoMRE, EVIDENCE § 784 (3d ed. 1940). A comparable
rule has been formulated in federal practice where the Supreme
Court has determined the status of the judge to be not that of a
mere-moderator, but the "governor" of the trial. Querciav. United
States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933). Canada has apparently followed
the tradition of the common law although in Boran v. Wenger
[1942] 2 D.L.R. 528 (Ont. Ct. App.), it was held that there was
no serious error when the trial judge in a non-jury case took
over examination of witnesses but had allowed counsel opportunity to add anything afterward. The court said the rule was,

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol. XXX

however, that a judge has no right to take the case into his own
hands from counsel except to see that any ambiguities were
cleared up.
In the United States the traditional concept of the common
law relegating the judge to the position of a moderator has never
been abandoned. Wornam v. Hampton Normal & Agricultural
Institute, 144 Va. 533, 132 S.E. 344 (1926). Perhaps no exact term
or status fits the judge except by way of describing what his
position is not. For example, it has been held that a judge is
not merely a "moderator at a town meeting" and neither should
he attempt to become an advocate, Fritts v. United States, 80
F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1935), and that the trial judge should endeavor not to show any "favor or disfavor" toward the parties
and witnesses, People v. Shiffman, 350 IMI. 243, 182 N.E. 760
(1932). It is not deemed improper to interrogate a witness, but
the concept of due process has placed the judge in a position
which requires that he be impartial and completely fair. Thus,
it is very possible that expressions of impatience by the judge
will tend to place counsel at a disadvantage with the jury or
tend to disparage counsel's case by implying disbelief of the
witness' veracity. Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Kranc, 193
Ark. 426, 100 S.W.2d 676 (1937). While the practice of asking
questions in order to elicit the truth is well-established, the court
must exercise careful discretion in the matter. In State v. Gleason,
86 Utah 26, 40 P.2d 222, 228 (1935), it was stated:
The practice of questioning by a judge is not to be recommended
or encouraged because even with the best of intentions a judge in
all sincerity may carry his examination too far and unwittingly
prejudice a defendant before the jury.

In Simpson v. Burton, 328 Mich. 557, 44 N.W.2d 178 (1950), the
court held, inter alia, that the interrogation of the witnesses and
the defendant by the trial judge was improper. The basis for
the court's decision was that the series of questions during an
intensive examination by the judge may have aroused suspicion
in the mind of the jury as to the credibility of the defendant.
The court said that the particular questions directed for clarity's
sake would normally be proper but the trial judge should not
persist so as to express his opinion to the jury. However, in
Aero Enterprises Inc. v. Walker, 123 Colo. 113, 228 P.2d 811
(1950), the court held questions proper if the trial judge has
exercised sound discretion in his examination. Further, the court
limited the extent of the questions by stating that interrogation
should only be used in exceptional instances where the purpose
is to elicit the truth or clarify a situation. Interruptions and
examination in a hostile manner are not fair to the defendant,
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for in a criminal prosecution,. the defendant is entitled to the
benefit of the presumption of innocence, even as to the judge.
Adler v. United States, 182 Fed. 464 (5th Cir. 1910), cert. denied,
223 U.S. 733 (1912). Accord, Holcomb v. State, 95 Okla. Crim.
55, 239 P.2d 806 (1952).
While it is generally recognized that it is the right of the trial
judge to take part in the examination of witnesses whenever he
deems it necessary to clearly understand the testimony, the
judge is limited to preserving a judicial attitude and refraining
from disclosing his views. State v. Davis, 83 N.H. 435, 144 Atl.
124 (1928). In People v. Rongetti, 331 M. 581, 163 N.E. 373, 379
(1928), the court points out the danger in exercising this power:
...
it is generally within the province of the court to propound
pertinent and properly framed questions to a witness to clear up the
record when it appears that such questions will not be asked by
counsel. The exercise of that power... is not only embarrassing to
counsel if leading, suggestive, and improper questions are asked,
but is always likely to arouse a serious apprehension in the minds
of the jury as to what the court thinks on the issue of guilt. To question a witness is a task of great delicacy when done by the court,
and even the tone or inflection of the voice of the judge may tend
to indicate to the jury what the court thinks ....

In Connecticut, more latitude is given to the right of the trial
judge to comment, the appellate court looking to the purpose
rather than the effect on the parties and jury. See State v. Cianflone, 98 Conn. 454, 120 Atl. 347 (1923). In the federal district
court, openly expressed opinion, otherwise prejudicial, is held
to be cured by instructions to the jury to disregard the opinion,
even when such instructions come at the end of the trial. United
States v. Aaron, 190 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied sub.
nom., Freidus v. United States, 242 U.S. 827 (1951).
The problem presented to the appellate court is whether or
not the trial judge has abused his discretion and thereby deprived
the defendant of a fair trial. The courts, reluctant to establish
any specific test because of the nature of the subject, prefer a
case by case approach. However, a general test was set out in
Garrett v. State, 187 Mfiss. 441, 193 So. 452, 455 (1940), where
the court said:
. .. an impartial trial is one of the constitutional rights of every
person accused of crime. In any case, a judge is not supposed to be
partial, biased or prejudiced, and by virtue of his training and experience in dealing with trials, matters of law and evidence, he can
distinguish the niceties of the situation and accord to every party his
full legal right. Should a case arise in which it was obvious that a
judge had been partial, biased or prejudiced, and that his attitude
and conduct had brought about an unfair trial, the Court would
reverse ....
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Understandably different considerations could reasonably apply
where a trial by jury is waived and the judge is relied upon
as the arbiter of the law and fact. The weight accorded to the
judgment of the trial court on appeal may be substantially in
his favor for the reason that the record does not reveal the actual
atmosphere of the trial. See United States v. Warren, 120 F.2d
211 (2d Cir. 1941), and Risley v. Lenwell, 277 P.2d 897, 909 (Cal.
App. 1954). It has been held, however, that the same considerations apply to the conduct of the court whether or not a jury
is present. People v. Giacomino, 347 IML 523, 180 N.E. 437 (1932).
In the latter case, very similar to the instant case, it was
contended that the conduct of the judge was improper in that he
asked too many questions concerning the defendant's alibi as well
as subjecting the witnesses to severe cross-examination. Although
recognizing that the trial court was properly exercising its
judicial power of inquiry, it was held that the judge should not
discomfort or confuse a witness by his questions or attitude while
searching for the truth. The court of appeals said that the principles of proper conduct are no different whether or not the cause
is before a jury and the judge should refrain from siding with
the prosecution or defense.
The restrictive mandate that the judge preside with utmost
impartiality and restrain himself from taking too active a part
in the progress of the trial has been deemed applicable to both
civil and criminal trials. Commonwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super.
333, 186 Atl. 177 (1936). In Rosenfeld v. Vosper, 45 Cal. App.
2d 365, 114 P.2d 29 (1941) (trial was before the judge sitting
without a jury), where judgment for damages was reversed
because of the trial court's admonition to the defendant to settle
out of court, it was held that the judge had pre-judged the issues
before the whole case was submitted; that giving such advice
compelled the conclusion that he had closed his mind to the
merits of the case. Where the trial judge gratuitously interrupted
counsel and aided him in a lengthy questioning of an adverse
medical witness, the court held that such acts furnished an
adequate explanation for the jury's verdict. Whitehead v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 264 App. Div. 647, 37 N.Y.S.2d 261 (3d Dep't 1942)
(alternative holding). Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1172 (1933).
As previously noted, the federal courts have taken a more
liberal view of the attitude which a trial judge may take toward
witnesses and the parties. United States v. Aaron, supra. After
examination of the record, the court in United States v. Warren,
120 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1941), held that, although the trial judge
was extremely curt in his conduct, such action was not so
prejudicial as to deny the complainant a fair trial. Further,
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the court explained that every word of the record should not be
jealously scrutinized, but rather the trial had to be taken in its
entirety to see if the end result was in accord with the evidence
presented. Some area of appellate control is expressed in Adler
v. United States, supra, where the court held that a judge may
not give the jury any impression that he has a fixed opinion of
the defendant's guilt or innocence. The court said, 182 Fed. at 472:
The trial judge, under the federal system, is not only permitted,
but it is his duty, to participate directly in the trial, and to facilitate
its orderly progress and clear the path of petty obstructions ....
But the conduct of the judge, in the performance of all his duties,
should appear to be impartial.

This impartiality is for the benefit of the jury, and if opinions are
stated, the jury must be instructed to the effect that they should
disregard them. Texarkana Bus Co. v. Baker, 142 F.2d 451 (5th
Cir. 1944). See also Quercia v. United States, supra. Further,
it has been held improper for a trial judge, during a criminal
trial, to interrupt the witness who is answering a question if the
effect is to put words in the witness' mouth. Williams v. United
States, 93 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1937).
The cases presented set out the principles from which a guide
may be formulated for determining when questioning of witnesses
or a party to an action by a trial judge is proper or improper.
A case by case determination may .be aided by the following
"rule of thumb" approach: A judge has not acted improperly if

his questions have been asked in all sincerity and fairness and
in a calm and friendly manner, being motivated by a desire for
truth and justice. He must not create an impression of passion or
prejudice toward one side or the other. Whatever variances might
be found from this broad test have invariably depended upon the
distinctions in the cases themselves. The court in the instant case
has followed the general view of the common law in this country.
Cornelius Jerome Smith

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY-BLooD GROUPING TESTS TO PROVE
PATERNIT=.-People v. Nichols, . . .ich. ...
. 67 N.W.2d 230

(1954). Defendant, the putative father of the complaining witness' illegitimate child, appealed from an adverse decision in the
lower court. Defendant alleged error on the part of the trial
judge for admitting blood grouping evidence, given by an expert
witness, which tended to show the defendant was the possible
father of the complaining witness' illegitimate child. Defendant
alleged further error in the court's instruction to the effect that
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the jury could give the evidence whatever weight it deemed
proper. The supreme court held that the admission of the testimony constituted reversible error. The court ruled that since
the error was prejudicial the resulting verdict should be reversed
and a new trial granted. One justice dissented on the grounds
that such testimony on blood grouping is "expert testimony"
and as such should be admissible for whatever weight the jury
believes it properly deserves.
The question in this case is whether the courts should admit
blood grouping evidence to prove paternity. The scope of this
discussion will be limited to the admissibility of blood grouping
evidence in actions concerning illegitimate children.
The admissibility of blood grouping evidence, when introduced
to show nonpaternity, is no longer questioned in the United
States. Many states have statutes expressly allowing blood
grouping tests when the admissibility of such evidence tends to
exclude the putative father. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-658 (Burns 1953);
ME. REV. STAT. c. 166, § 34 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAwS art. 12,
§ 17 (1951); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 126-a; STAT. OF NEV. C. 159 p.
234 (1951); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1 (1953); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 8006-16 (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 306 (1954); wIs. STAT.
§ 325.23 (1953). Most of these statutes have been interpreted by
the courts of these jurisdictions to expressly preclude admission
of blood grouping evidence to prove paternity. The position taken
by these courts is that by the very terms of such statutes blood
grouping evidence cannot be admitted unless it will prove nonpaternity. Miller v. Domanski, 26 N.J. Super. 316, 97 A.2d 641
(App. Div. 1953) (if evidence does not show exclusion of defendant the terms of the statute make such evidence inadmissible);
State ex tel. Freeman v. Morris, 156 Ohio St. 333, 102 N.E.2d 450
(1951) (results of blood tests where mere possibility of paternity
is disclosed is not competent, and its admission is prejudicial);
State ex rel. Wollock v. Brigham, 72 S.D. 278, 33 N.W.2d 285
(1948) (blood grouping evidence can never establish paternity;
order by trial judge for defendant to submit to blood grouping
test was set aside).
There is a judicial trend starting with Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me.
351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949), toward allowing blood grouping evidence
to be conclusive proof of nonpaternity. While the Maine statute
uses the same general terminology of the statutes enumerated
above in regard to admission of blood grouping evidence, the
court has recognized in the Jordan case that scientific advances
have reached the stage where blood grouping tests can prove
conclusively that a defendant was not the father of the child.
Accord, C. v C., 200 Misc. 631, 109 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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The latest legislation on the subject has made blood grouping
evidence conclusive as to nonpaternity provided there is no
disagreement between the experts. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.474
(Supp. 1954); CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1980.6 (1953); N.H. REV. LAWS
c. 126, § 4 (1953); oRE. REV. STAT. § 109.258 (1953). These statutes
follow the general pattern which was recommended in the 1952
HANDBOOK, NAT'L CONFERENCE COMM'RS ON UNIFORmV STATE LAWS,
at page 445:
Effects of Test Results. If the court finds that the conclusions of
all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests,
are that the alleged father is not the father of the child, the question
of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree
in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon
all the evidence. If the experts conclude that the blood tests show
the possibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission of this
evidence is within the discretion of the court, depending upon the
infrequency of the blood type.
The Michigan and California acts do not include that portion of
the recommended statute which makes blood grouping evidence
admissible, in the discretion of the trial judge, to prove paternity.
The Oregon and New Hampshire acts have followed the recommendations of the Commissioners in this respect and, at this
time, are the only states which have statutes which allow admission of blood grouping evidence to prove paternity. These statutes
leave the decision in the discretion of the trial judge as to the
admission of such evidence, and therefore it is not absolutely
admissible in all cases, as is permitted in nonpaternity cases.
There are a few isolated cases where blood grouping evidence
has been admitted to show a possibility of paternity without
statutory approval. Appeal of Ketcham, 254 App. Div. 776, 4
N.Y.S.2d 786 (2d Dep't 1938), held that admission of blood grouping evidence to show possibility of paternity over the objection
by defendant was error, but was harmless due to the abundance
of supporting evidence. A new trial was refused. In Livermore
v. Livermore, 223 Iowa 1155, 11 N.W.2d 389 (1943), evidence
was introduced on blood grouping to show a possibility of paternity. The trial judge gave an instruction allowing the jury to
give this evidence whatever weight they deemed proper. Defendant took exception to the charge along with other alleged errors
and on appeal the supreme court, without stating any reason, held
that there was no merit to the exception. The decision was primarily founded on the fact that there was considerable additional evidence supporting the conclusion reached by the jury.
The courts have used many types of evidence which could
prove only a possibility of paternity. This evidence would not
appear to be any less prejudicial to the defendant than blood
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grouping. In Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442
(1946), a child was shown to the jury in the arms of the putative
father and the closeness of resemblance left for the jury to determine. In this same case the court refused to overrule a verdict
against the defendant even though expert testimony on blood
grouping definitely ruled out the defendant as the possible
father. In Reams v. State ex rel. Favors,53 Ohio App. 19, 4 N.E.2d
151, 153 (1936), a baby was exhibited to the jury so that it might
determine if there was any real or fancied resemblance to its
putative father. The Ohio court of appeals said it could not know
how much weight was given to the evidence but it did not consider it reversible error. Also in Lawhead v. State, 99 Okla. 197,
226 Pac. 376-77 (1924), a child was shown to the jury and attention called to the tips of the child's ears for comparison to the
ears of the putative father. The appellate court said that this
was not reversible error. Accord, People v. Wing, 115 Mich. 690,
74 N.W. 179 (1898) (court refused to reverse case on grounds
that jury was allowed to consider alleged resemblances between
defendant and the child).
The admission of evidence which could only prove a possibility,
such as exhibiting children before the jury to compare them
with the putative father, or blood grouping evidence which tends
to show that defendant could have been the father, can be related
to a judicial statement in an analogous case, Shanks v. State, 185
Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945). Therein the court was of the opinion
that, 45 A.2d at 89: "To exclude evidence merely because it tends
to establish a possibility, rather than a probability, would produce
curious results not heretofore thought of......
The Michigan court has decided the instant case in conformity.
with the weight of authority, and it closely parallels that state's
recently passed blood grouping statute. lyIcH. STAT. ANN. § 25.474
(Supp. 1954). It is submitted that the admission of such evidence
should be permitted in the discretion of the trial court and should
not be reversible error in all cases. Since there are two blood
types, B and AB, which represent only small percentages of the
population [See McComIXcK, EviDENCE § 177 (1954) ] it may be a
wiser policy to allow the trial judge to use his discretion as to
admission. If proper instructions are given to the jury, such
evidence could be useful in determining the issues of the case.
It would at least be as useful, it is further submitted, as some of
the other modes of proof which the courts have allowed, such as
the exhibition of the child for comparison to the putative father.
While this whole question may be a matter of legislative action,
the judges who try the cases are in the best position to determine
whether the testimony will cause undue prejudice.
Allan C. Schmid

19551
INsURANcE

RECENT DECISIONS
-

DELIVERY IN GoOD HEALTH CLAUSE -

APPARENT

GooD HEALTH.-Brubaker v. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co.,
. . . Cal. App. ..

.,

278 P.2d 966 (1955). Plaintiff's husband

made application for two life insurance policies. The application
was completed on the 25th of March, 1952. A doctor, acting as
medical examiner for the defendant insurance company, found
the applicant to be "quite healthy." On April 11, 1952, the
policies were delivered to the insured. Two weeks after receiving
the policies the insured was found to be suffering with cancer;
until this time he had no knowledge of his affliction. On November 4, 1952, the insured died. The defendant tendered to the
plaintiff, beneficiary of the policy, the money which amounted
to the premiums paid on the policies, but the tender was not
accepted. Plaintiff brought this action to collect $7,000 on the
policies, and the superior court gave judgment for her. On
appeal the judgment was affirmed, the court holding that where
insured had been examined by insurer's physician and found
in good health, but actually had cancer, which caused his
death, "delivery in good health clause" in the policies did not
render the policies void.
The issue presented is whether, in the absence of fraud, a life
insurance policy is void if it is delivered to an insured not in
actual good health but apparently so, when the policy contains a
delivery in good health clause.
In the last few years a large number of courts have been loathe
to enforce these clauses against an innocent insured, preferring
to discover various means of depriving the insurers of the legal
effect of such clauses. The approaches to the problem vary from
holding the clauses to be effective only between the time the
policy is applied for and issued or delivered, National Life and
Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 230 Ky. 222, 18 S.W.2d 982 (1929),
to the few cases holding, as does the instant case, that these
clauses are not construed to be conditions precedent, but rather
mere stipulations which do not affect the validity of the insurance
contract. Schmidt v. PrudentialIns. Co. of America, 190 Minn.
239, 251 N.W. 683 (1933) (decided under statute providing applicant's statement controlling unless fraud shown), zmni. STAT. ANNOTATIoNS § 61.24 (1945).

The general rule of contract law, as well as early insurance law
was that innocent misrepresentations avoid the policy. See Note,
32 CoLum. L. REv. 522, 524 (1932). In compliance with this general principle, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held, in effect,
if the insured at the time of delivery was not in sound health, the
defendant is not liable on the policy, and this fact can be shown
by any competent evidence. GaUlantv. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co.,
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167 Mass. 53, 44 N.E. 1073 (1896). Accord, Home State Life Ins.
Co. v. Turner, 183 Okla. 575, 83 P.2d 832 (1938); De Rose v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 132 Pa. Super. 212, 200 Atl. 888, 890
(1938); Popowicz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 114 Conn. 333,
158 Atl. 885 (1932); Erickson v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 256
S.W. 108 (Mo. 1923); Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 106
Minn. 112, 118 N.W. 355 (1908); Barker v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 188 Mass. 542, 74 N.E. 945 (1905); Packard v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 72 N.H. 1, 54 Atl. 287 (1903).
The facts in Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, are
very similar to those of the instant case. A young boy applied
for life insurance and was found to be in good health by the insurance medical examiner. The policy was issued and delivered.
When the delivery was made the boy was afflicted with cancer,
which fact was discovered when the boy died shortly after the
delivery. The court held that a delivery in sound health clause
was a condition precedent, which was not met, thus making the
insurance contract unenforceable. If the contract is unenforceable the only liability of the insurance company is to return the
money paid in premiums on the policy. See Popowicz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra.
Of the courts which follow the apparent rather than the actual
good health requirement, a large number of them reach their
decisions by holding the delivery in good health clause applies
only to changes in the condition of the insured occurring after
the making or acceptance of the application for the policy and
before the issuance or delivery of the policy. James v. National
Life and Accident Ins. Co., 265 Ill. App. 436 (1932). The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held in Prudential Ins. Co. of America v.
Kudoba, 323 Pa. 30, 186 Atl. 793 (1936), that the sound health
clause must be restricted to mean only that the applicant did not
contract any new disease impairing his health nor suffer any material change in his physical condition between the time when
the medical examination was made and the date of the policy.
Accord, Stramagliav. Conservative Life Ins. Co., 319 Ill. App. 20,
48 N.E.2d 719, 722 (1943); Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. House,
156 Okla. 285, 10 P.2d 718, 723 (1932); New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Smith, 129 Miss. 544, 91 So. 456 (1922).
The decision in Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Elmore, 111
Miss. 137, 71 So. 305 (1916) is in line with the instant case. However, it presents a different approach to the problem. The facts
in this case were quite similar to those in the present case. The
insured died of tuberculosis shortly after the policy was delivered to her. She had been examined by the company doctor at
the time she applied for the policy and was found to be in good
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health. In deciding a delivery in good health clause did not void
the policy, the court said such a clause has no effect after the
policy has been delivered to the insured, unless fraud could be
shown. This same line of reasoning was followed by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in National Life Ins. Co. v. Grady, 185
N.C. 348, 117 S.E. 289 (1923). The court held the insurance company under a delivery in good health clause was authorized to
withhold the policy in case the insured shall be taken ill before
delivery, but where the policy was delivered to the insured the
company was concluded on this and other stipulations of like
kind except in case of fraud.
In many jurisdictions the decision of the issue presented in the
instant case has been greatly affected by legislation. A great majority of the states enacted statutes which were intended to save
policies of insurance from forfeiture for false statements contained therein, unless such statements were found to be material
to the risk. See generally, Note, 32 CoLum. L. REv. 522 (1932).
The statutes vary greatly but the general intent is to transform
warranties into common-law representations. vANcE, iNSUmAwCE,
§ 74 (3ed., 1951). The California statute, CAL. INS. CODE § 10113
(1935), reads in part as follows:
Every policy of life . . . insurance issued or delivered within
this State . . . shall contain and be deemed to constitute the
entire contract between the parties . . .; and all statements
purporting to be made by the insured shall, in the absence of fraud,
be representations and not warranties....

All but four states, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, and Maine, now
have statutes of a like nature. 8 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 94, 99
(1951). (An Iowa statute is discussed infra.)
The court in Salts v. PrudentialIns. Co., 140 Mo. App. 142, 120
S.W. 714, 718 (1909), construed the Missouri "representation"
statute so as to include within its provisions a delivery in good
health clause. The court said in substance that the legislature intended to prevent insurance companies from avoiding liability
on their contracts because of immaterial errors in representations
and warranties, therefore, the statute must apply to prevent defenses based on warranties being introduced into the policy as
conditions precedent. However, the Missouri statute further stated
in effect that if the unsound health of the insured at the time
of delivery caused or contributed to his death, the policy is not
enforceable. The Alabama statute contained no such restricting
clause and was given a very conclusive interpretation by that
state's supreme court in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mandelbaum,
207 Ala. 234, 92 So. 440 (1922). This court held that regardless of
whether the language used in the application was technically a

